Richard H. Shepherd v. Diversa-Cycle Products, Inc., Utah Industrial Commission, And State Insurance Fund : Petitioner\u27s Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1983 
Richard H. Shepherd v. Diversa-Cycle Products, Inc., Utah 
Industrial Commission, And State Insurance Fund : Petitioner's 
Brief 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Virginia Curtis Lee; Attorney for Petitioner 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellant, Shepherd v. Diversa-Cycle Products, No. 19100 (1983). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4658 
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD H. SHEPHERD, 
Applicant and Petitioner, 
vs. 
DIVERSA-CYCLE PRODUCTS, INC., 
UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
and STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
Case No. 19100 
Appeal from Final Order of the Utah State Industrial Commission 
FRANK NELSON 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
124 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT, 
VIRGINIA CURTIS LEE 
1458 PRINCETON AVENUE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84105 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
JAMES R. BLACK 
BLACK & MOORE 
SUITE 500, TEN WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT, 
STATE INSURANCE FUND 
GILBERT MARTINEZ 
ADMINISTRATOR SECOND INJURY FUND 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH 
P. 0. BOX 5800 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-5800 
f l LED 
CJ,_:::, S.'°''"'' Co,ri, Ut.h 
IN THE SJPREME 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
f: j C H A H (J I' o 11 f P rl E P n , 
Appl1•.rnt Petitioner, 
\j s. 
DiVCPSA-CYCLE PRODUCTS, INC., 
UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
and STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
Case No. 19100 
Appeal from Final Order of the Utah State Industrial Commission 
FRANK NELSON 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
124 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT, 
VIRGINIA CURTIS LEE 
1458 PRINCETON AVENUE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84105 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
JAMES R. BLACK 
BLACV & MOOPt 
SUITE 500. TEN WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE Cl rr. UTAH 84101 
ATTORNEY RESPONDENT, 
STATt FUND 
: _, 8 E_ R T M 11 11 : , i'J 
A I J l•l I 1•1 '. :- ' • '\ 1 I' C U •'IU I N ,J IJ R Y F UN D 
I b ,-1 Lg I -, 1'111 I .f-i 
110 
; H l r 1 /\, l 34110-5800 
i l1R1_r llF CONTENTS 
ii P r '1 i1 F n F THE CASE 
D FI I I ! !--',I [ fJ, L 
2 
COMM!SS:ON ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS 
POWERS lN AWARDING PETITIONER BENEFITS 
FROM rHE SELUHD :NJURY FUND FOR ONLY 10% OF THE 
:NG MILITARY PERMANENT PARTIAL D!SABILl-
1 JES RATHER THAN AWARDING PETITIONER COMPENSATION 
AS BY 35-1-69 ON THE BASIS OF HIS 
COMBINED PPE-EXI51 ING INJURIES RATED BY THE COMMIS-
SION TO Ell 32· ........ 7 
I I 'I 
Comµensation should be determined by the 
law in effect at the time of the injury . 8 
The law in effect at the time of the in-
jury ...... 9 
Histcrical purpose of post-war enactment 
of special fund legislation . . • . 10 
Petitioner has met the criteria entitling 
him to compensation from the Second ln-
Jury Fund . . . . • . . • 12 
Merger of successive disabilities en-
titles Petitioner to compensation from 
the Second Injury Fund . . . . 14 
Petitioner's permanent incapacity is sub-
st ant q l l y qreater than he would have in-
currPd if he had not had the pre-existing 
inr,-,p,1(1t; ..•....... 16 
N n ,- u t I 1 r' r -d y e x i st s t o deny Pet i t i oner 
,- ,,,,.,, P, -, Jr 1 ,_rn f r o the Second Injury Fund 
t' military impairment on 
"rJiJuble recovery" 19 
21 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
Cases 
Carpinelli v. Penn. Steel Castings Co. et al., 209 
Pa.Super. 390, 227 A.2d 912 (1967) .....• ll, 12 
David v. Industrial Commission et al., Utah, 649 
P.2d 82 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
Hermansen v. Webster Outdoor Advertising Co., 230 
So.2d 145 (Fla. 1970)............ 15 
Intermountain Health Care v. Ortega, Utah, 562 
P.2d 617 (1977)........ . 17, 19, 21 
Intermountain Smelting v. Capitano, Utah, 610 P.2d 
334 (1980) ..•............... 9, 10, 15, 
Kincheloe v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ogden and 
State Insurance Fund, Utah, 656 P.2d 440 
(1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 15, 23 
McPhie v. U.S. Steel Corp., Utah, 551 P.2d 504 
(1976) ............. , . . . . . 10, 17, 19, 
Northwest Carriers et al. v. Industrial Comm' n. et 
al. and Ingersoll et al. v. Camp et al., Utah, 
639 P.2d 138 (1981) ............. 23 
Paoli v. Cottonwood Hospital et al., Utah, 656 P.2d 
420 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . ... 20 
Smith v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 549 P.2d 448 
( 1976) . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. ln-
dustri al Comm'n. et al., Utah, 657 P.2d 764 
(1983) .................... 13, 18, 22 
White v. Indus tr i al Comm ' n . , Nebo School Di st r i ct 
et al. v. Cragun et al, & the Paris Co. et al. 
v. Industrial Comm'n. et al., Utah 604 P.2d 
478 (1979) .................. 17, 18, 21 
Statutes 
L. 1921, ch. 67, Section 3140, sub. 6 ...... ll 
ii 
Section 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended . . . . . . . . . . . • . 16 
Authorities 
Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 2, Sec-
tion 59.32(f), pp. 10-444 to 10-447 ..•..•. 14, 15 
, ii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD H. SHEPHERD, 
Applicant and Petitioner, 
vs. 
DIVERSA-CYCLE PRODUCTS, INC., 
UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
and STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
Case No. 19100 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for review of a final order entered 
by a majority of the Utah State Industrial Commission on 
March 8, 1983. The commission awarded Petitioner temporary 
total disability benefits for a period of six months; benefits 
for 5% permanent partial impairment sustained in an industrial 
accident on December l, 1979; and benefits for 10% pre-existing 
permanent partial impairment incurred during World War II while 
Petitioner was in the military service of the United States. 
The Commission denied Petitioner compensation from the Second 
lnJury Fund for the remainder of his 37% combined injuries. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Pet1t1oner seeks reversal of the Commission's denial of 
compensation from the Second Injury Fund for the remainder 
of his 37% combined injuries. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the course of his employment with the defendant 
company on December l, 1979, the Petitioner fell and struck 
on the edge of an open pit and on a pipe. (R. 167, R. 164 and 
R. 168) Petitioner was knocked unconscious. (R. 167, R. 164 
and R. 168) In the process of the fall, he hit his neck 
against a steam pipe causing some burns and his right hip 
hit the corner of the pit opening. (R. 168) 
This incident occurred about 12:00 noon. Petitioner 
tried to continue work after recovering but could not do so 
effectively. (R. 168) Peitioner drove himself to the emer-
gency room of the L.D.S. Hospital in Salt Lake City where 
x-rays were taken. (R. 12-13, R. 168) It was noted 
that Petitioner had an abrasion of the right hip and a mus-
cle strain of the right side of the neck. He was given a 
sling and advised to rest and take pain medications. (R. 168) 
He continued to have pain in his neck, back and shoul-
der. He was off work until mid-January of the following 
year. He was terminated by his company. He feels he could 
have done some of the work, but apparently could not do all 
that was expected of him. He continued to have 
in the right side of his neck. (R. 164) 
Petitioner could not return to work December 3, because 
he was having problems with his lower back, shoulder, cla-
v1cle and neck. (R. 168) On December 3, he visited the 
V.A. Hospital, Dr. Latimer and a chiropractor, Dr. Wayman. 
HP did not return to the V.A. Hospital for treatment of 
this inJury but did return to the V.A. Hospital around 
March 10, 1980, for another problem. (R. 168) Petitioner 
has had black out attacks since the accident. (R. 169) 
By way of history, while in the military service the 
Petitioner was thrown from a truck and suffered back, shoul-
der, hip and leg injuries from which he was disabled until 
about December 1945. (R. 169) More particularly, Petitioner 
was thrown out of the truck onto his neck and shoulder, sus-
taining a cervical fracture, a dislocation of both shoul-
ders, an injury to both ankles, fractured ribs, injury to 
hips and knees dislocated. (R. 74, R. 26) In 1946 he re-
ceived a 20% disability rating from the Veterans Admini-
stration and then in 1977 he received a government combined 
rating of 60%, which included 40% for his back. (R. 169) 
The medical panel did not merely restate the 60% rating 
given Petitioner by the Veterans Administration, but as-
signed him 20% pre-existing permanent partial impairment for 
his lower back, 10 pre-existing permanent partial impair-
ment for his neck and 5% pre-existing permanent partial im-
pairment for sensory loss from surgery to relieve the pain 
of the war injuries. (R. 166) In 1962, Petitioner had a 
rh1z0tomy on his lower back to alleviate the pain he suffered 
from the service injury. (R. 74, R. 24-25) 
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The Medical Panel Report was submitted in evidence and 
the findings therein were adopted by the Administrative Law 
Judge as his own: 
"l. The percentage of permanent partial 
impairment at this time is as follows: 
Involvements 
Low Back 
Neck 
Sensory Loss ('11rgery) 
Percent 
Pre-existing 
20 Percent 
l 0 Percent 
5 Percent 
Syncope of uncertain etiology: 
of Whole Man 
Related to 
0 Percent 
5 Percent 
0 PF>rcent 
Injury 
Note: From the present information, it seems 
unlikely that there is a direct connection between 
the syncopal episodes and the effects of the injury. 
There is no confirmation of any certain period of 
unconsciousness from an injury to the head at the 
time, and those who saw the patient most immediately 
did not record any unconsciousness or neuro-symptoms 
whatsoever. The initial events were quite delayed 
and apparently related to emotional factors as much 
as anything. However, this formulation may be modi-
fied by more definitive information which may become 
available to the panel members. (R. 169) 
2. A reasonable period of temporary total dis-
ability is set at six months, as being ample time for 
recovery from the physical effects of the injury .. 
( R. l 70) 
The Administrative Law Judge finds the applicant 
is entitled to temporary total disability compensa-
tion based on six months or 26 weeks ... The appli-
cant is further entitled to permanent partial impair-
ment benefits base on ... The medical panel found 
the applicant had a pre-existing impairment of 
which would combine to The applicant has been 
compensated for more than that amount in pre-existing 
permanent partial impairment benefits and is not en-
titled to additional benefits from the Second Injury 
Fund for that purpose. The insurance carrier, however, 
is entitled to reimbursement for a portion of its medi-
cal costs and temporary total disability compensation 
payments, which reimbursement should be based on a 
4 
ratio of 32/37's of the amounts paid by the State 
'.nsurance Fund." (R. 170) 
The Administrative Law Judge ordered, inter alia: 
l. The State Insurance Fund pay Petitioner $4,000 
for temporary total disability compensation and $2, 184 for 
permanent partial impairment benefits attributable to the 
industrial accident. 
2. The Second Injury Fund reimburse the State 
Insurance Fund for 32/37's of the medical costs and temporary 
total disability. (R. 170) 
On or about June 7, 1982, Petitioner, by and through 
counsel, timely filed a Motion for Review alleging the Admini-
strative Law Judge had erred in not awarding Petitioner com-
pensation for pre-existing conditions. (R. 173-174) 
On January 13, 1983, a majority of the Commission af-
firmed the Administrative Law Judge's award of temporary to-
tal disability benefits and compensation for 5% permanent 
partial impairment resulting from the December l, 1979, in-
dustrial accident. (R. 179-182) However, the Commission re-
versed the Administrative Law Judge's denial of benefits for 
Petitioner's permanent for the pre-existing 10% condition of 
the neck. The Commission ordered, 
. that the Administrator of the Second Injury 
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the 
State Treasurer as Custodian of the Second Injury 
Fund, to pay the Applicant compensation at the rate 
of 5140.00 per week for 31.2 weeks or a total of 
$4,368.00, as compensation for a 10% permanent par-
tial impairment attributable to pre-existing condi-
tions, said amount to be paid in a lump sum." (R.180) 
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With respect to compensation for the full re-
mainder of Petitioner's combined permanent partial im-
pairment, the majority wrote: 
" ... But common sense would dictate that the same 
rules precluding double compensation from workmen's 
compensation should apply for pre-existing problems 
which were fully compensated and were not exacer-
bated by the industrial accident." (R. 179) 
Commissioner Saathoff dissented from the majority: 
"The original Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge denied pre-existing disability benefits to the 
applicant, but awarded reimbursement to the State 
Insurance Fund. The Motion for Review filed by the 
applicant was on this issue. In my opinion the sta-
tute requires that the applicant is entitled to 
benefits under Section 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated 
before the insurance carrier is eligible for reim-
bursement. The majority of the Commission makes the 
assumption that the Legislature intended that all 
pre-existing disability that has previously been com-
pensated, should be denied, even though incurred in 
the military service of our country. I do not read 
this intent into Section 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated. 
I do, however, concur that any permanent partial 
disability resulting from an industrial accident, 
once compensated should not be compensated again. 
The majority also assumes that statute gives the Com-
mission the authority to separate pre-existing dis-
abilities and to award benefits from the Second Injury 
Fund only for those pre-existing disabilities which 
are to the same portion of the body as was injured in 
the industrial accident, again, I do not interpret 
Section 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated, to give the Com-
mission the authority to separate these disabilities 
in determining Second Injury Fund benefits. I be-
lieve this policy would defeat one of the main pur-
poses of that Section, which is to encourage employers 
to hire people who have some degree of pre-existing 
disability. I think recent Supreme Court decisions 
have upheld this concept. I would therefore grant the 
Motion for Review, except for awarding benefits for 
the 5% sensory loss." (R. 181) 
Petitioner adopted Commissioner Saathoff's arguments and 
on or about January 27, 1983, filed a Motion for Review of 
the January 13 Order. ( R. 183-189 I On March 8, 1983, the 
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maiority denied Petitioner's Motion for Review and affirmed 
its Order of January 13. (R. 191-192) Commissioner Saat-
hoff again dissented. (R. 191) Petitioner has appealed from 
that March 8, 1983, Denial of Motion for Review. (R. 194-197) 
That appeal is before this Court now. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COMMISSION ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS STATUTORY 
POWERS IN AWARDING PETITIONER BENEFITS FROM THE SECOND IN-
JURY FUND FOR ONLY OF PRE-EXISTING MILITARY PERMANENT 
PARTIAL DISABILITIES RATHER THAN AWARDING PETITIONER COMPEN-
SATION AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 35-1-69 ON THE BASIS OF HIS 
COMBINED PRE-EXISITNG INJURIES RATED BY THE COMMISSION TO BE 
3 2 
The compensation to which Petitioner is entitled should 
be determined by the law in effect at the time of the injury 
in 1979. The law in effect in 1979 reflected no legislative 
intent to deny benefits from the Second Injury Fund on the 
basis of precluding double recovery. The historical purpose 
of the Second Injury Fund statutes in effect at the time of 
the injury was to encourage the hiring of handicapped vet-
erans and civilians returning from war by creating the "spe-
cial fund." 
Petitioner has met the criteria entitling him to com-
pensation from the Second Injury Fund for his 32% pre-
existing military permanent partial impairment. The merger 
af Petitioner's successive disabilities entitles him to 
cumpensation from the Second lnJury Fund_ Petitioner's 37% 
µermanent partial impairment is substantially greater than 
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t h ,n etfect Jt the 
:n case 0f an Jr1sirg before the effective date 
of Section 35-'-69 JS :ast amended in 1981 but not heard 
until aften1arj, the le·1el of benefits to be awarded should 
be deter11ined by the law in effect at the time of the injury, 
not at time of the award. Smith v. Industrial Commission. 
Utah, 549 P.Zd 448 : 19761. ne Administrator of the Second 
;nJury Fund noted that the 1981 amendment to Section 35-1-69 
"applies only to injuries occurred on or after May 12, 
1981, the effective date of the change." (R. 177) Petitioner 
injury occurred on December l, 1979. 
:n Kincheloe v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ogden & State 
!ns. Fund, Utah, 656 P.2d HO 11982), the Court observed in 
footnote on page 442: 
"In 1981, the legislature did change the law 
in an apparent attempt t0 preclude "double recovery" 
for a pre-existing injury. :nasmuch as the incident 
concerned occurred in 1980, we are bound to ap-
p:y the law as of that date." 
, .. ,ie statutory and case law , n effect on December l, 1979 
evidenced no intent to jeny :Jmpensation from the Second In-
jury Fund for pre-existing lli'itar; permanent partial im-
pair'Tlent. 
a u t h 0 r 1 t / ' n ) p p 1 y l n g r e '=:' 'l t 3 .. ) t J r' j 3 'I a c 3 s e d \'/ p r e -
;und payment 
___' '_" __ : , 1·1 1 n e t f e c t a t t h e t i m e o f t h e i n j u r y 
i1 e I aw pr i c: r to the I 9 8 I amendments to Sect i on 3 5 - 1 - 6 9 
,. µ 'P 1 ,J i n g rec u v er J fr om the Sec on d ; n j u r y Fund w h ere a merger 
t •, , 1 ': c e s s l'I e d i s ab i 1 i t i es t a k e s p I ace w a s ex em p I i f i e d i n 
Intermountain Smelting v. Capitano, Utah, 610 P.2d 334 (1980). 
:n thJt case, the applicant for workmen's compensation fell 
Jnd severely injured his right ankle while working on a con-
struction project. The applicant had a pre-existing injury 
(he had been shot in the left leg while in the military ser-
vice in Korea) for which he had been given a 30: disability 
rating and monthly compensation in the amount of Sll3 for 
1 ife. A medical panel found that the applicant had sustained 
a 30 loss of use of his right foot; that the shifting in 
weight had also adversely affected the use of his left foot; 
and that the combined effects of both injuries amounted to 
a loss of bodily function of The Commission held that 
of the 8.5 was attributable to the construction in-
jury and 16.5 to the pre-existing injury, but refused to 
order proportional contribution from the second injury fund. 
Qn appeal, this Court held that pursuant to statute, the em-
ployer is responsible for only the percentage of compensation 
and medical care which the industrial injury bears to the ap-
1.l •cant's total disability; the remainder of the total disa-
1 1 ,,, is to be paid out of the second injury fund. 
1 n Capitano, the Court recognized the Commission's de-
,,.,. t- 1n1n111ize e<.penditure from the Second Injury Fund, but 
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an efllp1:'J>?r' right to reimbursement 
rrom the Seccnd cJna wnere the employee was awarded 
bene•1ts for an industrial lnJur; and for pre-existing 
mi i itar; permanent part•al impairment. The Commission made 
no attempt tJ Jeny applicant tnere compensation for his 
pre-existing 16.S mi 11tary permanent partial impairment. 
ihe Comm1ss1Jn, did attempt to begrudge the employer 
reimbursement from tne Second :nJury Fund on other grounds. 
ihe Court instr·Jcted the Commission: 
. :f it is the Comm1ss1on'sl conviction that 
the law should be different (regarding disbursements 
from the Sec end '.nJury Fund', perhaps that should 
be addressed to the legislature, whose function 
and prerooat1ve it is to make changes or clarif1-
cat1ons ,; the la· ... " Capitano, id. 
:n 1981. the Legislature amended Section 35-1-69. The 
ei:pressed 'l:J intent . .., tnc.se amendments to aeny 
Jnd an employee 
has suffere.j a ;:; r e - e ., s ':. · ·1 J s 1 i 
.... l S t \J r L ) 1 J r· '' , >? '" , .. •I 1--:- 'l t s p e r: 1 a ; _J 
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'. 1• I :es wh1ch was ratified on Januar; 10, 1920, and 
Section 3140, sub. 6 read: 
6. If any employee who has previously incurred 
partial disability incurs a subsequent 
permanent partial disability such tnat the compensa-
•i,,n pa;able for the disability resulting from the 
comDined injuries is greater that the compensation 
which eccept to the pre-e1isting disabi lit; would 
have been payable for the latter injury, the emplo-
;ee shall receive compensation on the basis of the 
combined injuries, but the liability of his employer 
sha 11 be for the latter injury only and the remainder 
shall be paid out of the special fund provided for 
1n subdivision l of this section." L. 1921, ch. 67. 
:t fairly can be said from the date of enactment, that 
the legislature intended through the enactment Jf subsection 
6 to encourage the hiring of handicapped veterans and civi-
lians returning from war by creating the "special fund." 
Pennsylvania's second injury fund was created just 
after World War II. In a case quite similar to the case at 
bar, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that a handi-
capped employee, who had previously lost his right leg (pre-
sumably 1n the military service of the United States) and who 
l a t e r s u s t a i n e d a n i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y, w a s e n t i t l e d t o r e c e i v e 
hµne•its from that state's second injury reserve fund. Car-
Ii 1. Penn. Steel Castings Co. et al., 209 Pa.Super. 
n t he '·' p i ri i 'J n , the Penn s y l v a n i a c our t noted th at 
"•1 ' 1 1 n 1 a ' ·; sec ,Jn d 1 n jury res er,, e fund statute had been 
", ' ,, 1 n ! q c, , 'H h en a n i n f l u x of h and i c a pp e d war veter ans 
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was anticipated. The Pennsylvania legislature had indicated 
in its journal that the underlying purpose of the statutes 
was to 1 i be r a 1 i z e the comp ens at 1 on l aw "to g i v e the hand i -
capped worker greater opportunity and ... to provide less 
risk for employers ... " The court ruled that the Workmen's 
Compensation Law, being remedial legislation, should be 
construed in favor of those it intended to benefit. The 
court affirmed the order of the Workmen's Compensation Board 
awarding the employee compensation from the second injury 
reserve fund. 
The Utah legislature intended through the enactment 
of statutes creating the "special fund" in 1921 to encour-
age the hiring of handicapped veterans by relieving em-
ployers of liability for pre-existing impairment. The Utah 
1 e g i s 1 at u r e h a s n o t s-;-nTe r e p e a 1 e d t h e " s p e c i a l f u n d " s t a -
tutes or expressed an intent that the veterans the laws his-
torically intended to benefit should be dispossessed. 
To affirm the Commission's denial of Second Injury Fund 
compensation for Petitioner's pre-existing war injuries would 
be to disembowel the "special fund" statutes of the very 
purpose for which they were created. This Court must reverse 
the Commission's denial of benefits from the Second Injury 
Fund for the remainder of Petitioner's 37'; permanent partial 
impairment. 
Petitioner has met the criteria entitling him to compensation 
from the Second Injury Fund 
Explicit statutory authority exists to award compensa-
l 2 
t1on from the Second Injury Fund, provided pertinent 
conditions are met. Basically, those conditions are three 
1n number: l) permanent incapacity occasioned by acciden-
tal inJury, disease or congenital causes, followed by 2) 
subsequent injury resulting in further permanent incapacity 
which is 3) substantially greater than that which would have 
been incurred had there been no pre-existing incapacity. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Industrial Com-
m'n. et al., Utah, 657 P.2d 764 (1983). These conditions 
are the conditions set forth in Section 35-1-69, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The Administrative Law Judge found that Petitioner had 
sustained permanent incapacity occasioned by accidental in-
jury which occurred during World War II, while he was in the 
military service of the United States. The medical panel 
determined, and the Administrative Law Judge found, that 
Petitioner suffered a combined 32% pre-existing permanent 
partial impairment as the result of military injuries and 
surgery to relieve the pain of the injuries. 
The Administrative Law Judge found that Petitioner in-
curred subsequent industrial injury on December l, 1979, 
which resulted in further permanent partial incapacity of 
uf the whole man. The permanent incapacity resulting from 
thP industrial accident was substantially greater than that 
which would have been incurred had there been no pre-existing 
111capac1ty. But for Petitioner's impaired agility he would 
"ri t have suffered any i n jury at al l when he s l i pp e d on the 
l 3 
ice and grease at the edge of the pit. 
Merger of successive d1sabil1ties entitles Petitioner to com-
pensation from the Second Injury Fund 
The majority attempts to narrow the range of Second In-
jury Fund liability by denying compensation from the Fund 
for that portion of pre-existing problems which "were not 
exacerbated by the industrial accident." (R. 179) The Com-
mission awarded Petitioner permanent partial benefits for 
the pre-existing condition of the neck. The majority 
wrote: 
. This area was directly involved in the 
industrial accident and the condition was sub-
stantially worsened as a result of that incident." 
( R. 180) 
The majority misconstrues the "merger" doctrine as it 
generally applies in second injury fund cases. Professor 
Larson writes: 
" ... The question sometimes arises whether the 
second injury must be shown to have been related 
to or to have acted upon the prior injury (footnote 
omitted) - as, for example, when the loss of a thumb 
combines with previous loss of fingers of the same 
hand. It is generally held that no such special 
relation between the injuries is necessary, so long 
as the existence of the former substantially aug-
ments the disability ensuing from the latter." Lar-
son's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 2, 
59.32{f), pp. I0-444 to I0-447. 
The learned professor concludes that even though injuries 
are not physically related, where a merger of successive 
disabilities takes place, a claimant is entitled to an 
award from the second injury fund. 
In a footnote, Professor Larson cites rlermansen v. Web-
IJ 
Outdoor Advertising Co., 230 So.Zd 145 (Fla. 1970), 
where a finding that the claimant's prior leg injury had not 
"merqed" with a subsequent injury because the leg condition 
wJs in no way affected by the second injury was held to be 
error, since merger does not require a reinjury of the pre-
viously injured part of the body. Larson, supra, footnote 
at the bottom of p. 10-446. 
This Court has recently recognized the generally held 
requirement that where a merger of successive disabilities 
takes place a claimant is entitled to an award from the 
Second Injury Fund. In Kincheloe, supra, the Court wrote: 
"Under the reasoning of Capitano, the fact 
that the 1980 injury is unrelated to the 1974 injury 
is not dispositive. Irrespective of any causal con-
nection, the second injury fund is to compensate one 
who sustains "permanent incapacity which is substan-
tially greater that he would have incurred if he had 
not had the pre-existing incapacity." 
The claimant in Kincheloe would have been entitled to an 
award from the Second Injury Fund, but for the fact that the 
Administrative Law Judge had found that he had recovered from 
the 15% prior permanent parital pre-existing impairment he 
had sustained prior to his 1980 5% permanent partial indus-
trial impairment. 
The Commission erred in denying Petitioner com-
pensation from the Second Injury Fund for all of his com-
t11ned 32' pre-existing impairment and in awarding Petitioner 
, 11n pen s at i on for on l y t he l O pre - ex i st i n g neck con di ti on , 
only the pre-existing neck impairment was ag-
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gra1ated by the accident. The Commission 
found that the neck condition was substantially worsened 
as a result of the industrial accident. Merger does not 
require a reinjury of each part of the body previously 
impaired. The Commission's finding that the neck con-
dition was substantially worsened as a result of the in-
dustrial accident satisfies the requirement for compen-
sation from the Second Injury Fund that Petitioner have 
suffered permanent incapacity which is substantially 
greater than he would have incurred if he had not had the 
pre-existing incapacity. This Court must reverse the Com-
mission's denial of compensation for all of the remainder 
of Petitioner's combined injuries. 
Petitioner's permanent incapacity is substantially greater 
than he would have incurred if he had not had the pre-
existing incapacity 
Section 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
provided on December l, 1979, in pertinent part: 
(1) If any employee, who has previously incurred 
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury, dis-
ease, or congenital causes, sustains an industrial 
injury for which compensation and medical care is 
provided by this title that results in permanent 
incapacity which is substantially greater than 
he would have incurred if he had not had the pre-
existing incapacity, compensation and medical care 
... shall be awarded on the basis of the combined 
injuries, but the liability of the employer for 
such compensation shall be for the industrial in-
jury only and the remainder shall be paid out of 
the special fund provided for in section 35-1-68 
hereinafter referred to as the "special fund." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The Industrial Commission has struggled with the lan-
guage "sub st anti ally greater." In Intermountai n Health 
Care v. Ortega, Utah, 562 P.2d 617 (1977), this Court 
construed the language "substantially greater." There 
Justice Crockett wrote: 
The requirement that the pre-existing condition 
combines with the later injury to cause a "substan-
tially greater" permanent incapacity does not mean 
that the former must be greater than the latter. 
It simply means that it be some definite and mea-
surable portion of the causation of the disability." 
562 P.2d at 619. 
In Ortega, the Commission, as directors of the Second 
lnJury Fund, posed its denial of benefits from the Second 
Injury Fund on the ostensible basis that because the pre-
existing condition was quiescent and did not require medi-
cal treatment until the accident, the employer should be 
held responsible for the expenses thereof. The Court pointed 
out: 
" ... that if the requirement of the statute is 
met, that is, if the resulting permanent incapacity 
is substantially greater than if the pre-existing 
incapacity had not existed, the proportionate cau-
sation must be found and that portion attributable 
to the previous condition paid out of the special 
fund. (See McPhie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 
504 (Utah 1976), concurring op1n1on of Justice 
Ellett.) Ortega, supra. 
In White v. Industrial Comm'n., Nebo School District 
et al. v. Cragun et al., and the Paris Co. et al. v. In-
cJustrial Comm'n. et al., Utah 604 P.2d 478 (1979), this 
Court instructed the Industrial Commission to award com-
from the Second Injury Fund where pre-existing 
impairment was followed by further permanent incapacities 
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of 5% in the cases of applicants Christensen and White. 
The Court expressed no reservation regarding whether 
the 5% further incapacities incurred by applicants Chris-
tensen and White were substantially greater than those 
which would have been incurred had there been no pre-
existing incapacities. 
Similarly, in United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company, supra, the Court expressed no reservation re-
garding whether the possible 5% further incapacity in-
curred by the applicant there was substantially greater 
than that which would have been incurred had there been 
no pre-existing incapacity. The Court wrote: 
" ... It is therefore necessary to remand this 
case to the Commission for the purpose of submit-
ting (the issue of a medical panel determination of 
the impairment resulting from the industrial acci-
dent) to an appropriate medical .panel. The medical 
panel shall then review the medical aspects of this 
case and determine the percentage of impairment 
resulting from the subsequent injury. After having 
been apprised of the determinations of the medical 
panel, the Commission shall then assign liability 
for the payment of present and future medicals." 
657 P.Zd at 767. 
The Court instructed the Commission to determine whether 
the subsequent injuries sustained resulted in further per-
manent incapacity "which is substantially greater than he 
would have incurred if he had not had the pre-existing in-
capacity." 
In the case at bar, Petitioner's 5% industrial impair-
ment is 13.5% of the total impairment that he has suffered. 
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Under Ortega, McPhie and White, the law in effect at the time 
of Petitioner's industrial injury, Petitioner's pre-existing 
combined 32'1, impairment was a "definite and measurable por-
tion of the causation of Petitioner's total 37% combined 
d i s a b i l i t y. " I t f a i r l y c a n b e s a i d t h at t h at Pet i t i oner ' s 
combined 32 impairment was a definite and measurable por-
tion of the causation of Petitioner's subsequent 5% in-
dustrial impairment; but for Petitioner's reduced agility, 
he would not have suffered any industrial injury. Peti-
tioner's pre-existing condition increased the resulting 
disability by 86.5%. Consequently, under the requirements 
of the statute in effect at the time of Petitioner's in-
dustrial accident, it follows that compensation should have 
been awarded from the Second Injury Fund for all of Peti-
tioner's combined 32% per-existing impairment. The Court 
must reverse the Order of the majority denying Petitioner 
compensation for all but 10% of his pre-existing permanent 
partial impairment. 
No authority exists to deny Petitioner compensation from 
the Second Injury Fund for pre-existing military impair-
ment on the basis of "double recovery" 
In 1981, the legislature did change the law in an 
apparent attempt to preclude "double recovery." Because 
the industrial injury aggravated Petitioner's pre-existing 
injury and because Petitioner's pre-existing injury was 
not compensated for under the Workmen's Compensation Act or 
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the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, the 1981 
amendments would not preclude recovery in this case. Re-
cent case law would not preclude recovery in this case 
either. In Paoli v. Cottonwood Hospital et al., Utah, 
656 P.2d 420 (1982), the Court held that an injured em-
ployee should not be permitted to recover against the Second 
Injury Fund for a pre-existing condition attributable to 
an industrial injury for which he has already been compen-
sated under the Workmen's Compensation laws of another state. 
In David v. Industrial Commission et al., Utah, 649 P.Zd 
8 2 (1982), the Court held that where an injured employee 
applied simultaneously for compensation for a pre-existing 
injury and for a subsequent industrial injury, the em-
ployee was not entitled to an additional award from the 
Second Injury Fund for the pre-existing impairment. Neither 
case stands for the proposition that a disabled American 
veteran permanently partially impaired as a result of an 
industrial accident should be denied compensation from the 
"special fund" created by the legislature to encourage the 
hiring of handicapped veterans. 
World War I and II may be far behind us now, but that 
does not entitle the Commission to abrogate legislation in-
tended, in some small way, to repay the debt the citizens 
of this state felt they owed to those who risked their lives 
and limbs to defend our precious nation. That the Congress 
chose to express its gratitude to our veterans by enacting 
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legislation to compensate them for injuries sustained in 
the service of our nation should not be held against these 
brave men. The laws intended to honor our veterans must 
be upheld. Lest we forget. 
CONCLUSION 
In McPhie, supra, the Commission refused the applicant 
compensation from the Second Injury Fund on the basis that 
his permanent total impairment was not substantially 
greater than he would have incurred if he had not had a 
pre-existing incapacity. The Court remanded the case 
to the Commission to make new findings regarding whether 
the applicant's permanent 100% incapacity was substantially 
greater than if he had not had a major pre-existing impair-
ment. 
In Ortega, supra, the Commission denied proportionate 
contribution from the Second Injury Fund to the employer 
because the applicant's pre-existing condition remained quie-
secent and did not require medical treatment until the sub-
sequent industrial accident. The Court reversed the Com-
mission's denial of contribution from the fund. 
In White, supra, the Commission refused to order pro-
portional contribution from the Second Injury Fund to the 
employer on the bases that the 3-year statute of limita-
t1,ins on the pre-existing injury had run (Christensen, 
1 that the permanent incapacity was not substantially 
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greater than would have been incurred if applicant had not 
had the pre-existing condition (Christensen, White), and 
that the applicant was better off after the industrial ac-
cident by having had the pre-existing condition taken care 
of and stabilized (White). The Court reversed the Com-
mission's denial of contribution from the fund. 
In Capitano, supra, the Commission denied proportional 
contribution from the Second Injury Fund to the employer for 
medical and temporary total disability payments on the bases 
that the applicant's pre-existing injury had nothing to do 
with the subsequent industrial injury or the medical ex-
penses or temporary total disability payments incident 
thereto and that payment of medical and temporary total 
disability would deplete the fund. The Commission made no 
attempt there to argue that the applicant should be denied 
compensation for his pre-existing service connected im-
pairment because he was receiving veterans disability 
compensation from the United States government for his war 
injuries. The Court reversed the Commission's denial of 
contribution from the fund. 
In U.S.F.&G., supra, the Commission apportioned pre-
sent and future medical expenses between the pre-existing 
and subsequent insurance carriers and refused to order 
proportional contribution from the Second Injury Fund where 
pre-existing and industrial impairment had resulted from 
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four separate industrial accidents on the basis that the 
pre-exi>ting and industrial impairment had resulted from 
an industrial accident, rather than from other non-in-
dustrial accidental, disease, of congenital causes. The 
Court did not subscribe to the reasoning of the Commission. 
In Northwest Carriers et al. v. Industrial Comm'n et 
al. and Ingersoll et al. v. Camp et al., Utah, 639 P.Zd 
138 (1981), the Commission denied reimbursement from the 
Second Injury Fund to the State Insurance Fund for ex-
trinsic factors contributing to total disability. The 
Court ordered reimbursement from the fund. 
In Kincheloe, supra, the Commission attempted to deny 
compensation and proportionate contribution, inter alia, 
on the basis that the part of the body injured in the in-
dustrial accident bore no relation to the part of the body 
previously injured. The Court indicated the fact that 
the industrial injury was unrelated to the previous injury 
was not dispositive. 
In the case at bar, the Commission again resolutely 
denies payment from the Second Injury Fund under theories 
inapplicable to the circumstances involved. To date the" 
legislature had expressed no intent to repudiate the his-
torical purpose of the Second Injury Fund to encourage the 
l1H1ng of handicapped veterans and civilians returning from 
wctr by conferring a benefit upon employers. The Court 
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must construe the remedial Second Injury Fund statute, Sec-
tion 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in 
favor of one of those it intended to benefit. 
The merger of Petitioner's successive pre-existing 
military impairment with the industrial impairment has 
resulted in permanent partial impairment substantially 
greater than Petitioner would have incurred if he had not 
been disabled during World War II. The Commission found 
that Petitioner's condition was "substantially worsened 
as a result of that incident." (R. 180) The fact that Pe-
titioner's back was not reinjured in the 1979 industrial 
accident is no basis for denying him compensation from the 
Second Injury Fund. The fact that the industrial impair-
ment is a definite and measurable portion of the causation 
of Petitioner's 37% permanent partial disability is dis-
positive. The Court must reverse the Order of the Majority 
denying Petitioner compensation for all but 10% of his pre-
existing permanent partial military impairment and must order 
the Commission to award Petitioner compensation from the 
Second Injury Fund for the remainder of his combined in-
juries. 
DATED this .Lj jt_ day 
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